Actually Smart Contractsalpha
How it works

From an English rule to a signed result

The full mechanism, for engineers. The homepage tells the story; this page shows the parts.

The parts

Compiler
English to a loop-free step list; a second model hunts for loopholes; a person signs off.
Inscription
IQ Labs code-in stores the steps; the ASC is referenced by its transaction id and the hash of its bytes.
Jury harness
Holds juror keys, hashes evidence, runs commit then reveal, drops invalid answers, tallies quorum.
Escrow
Pays only listed outcomes to listed payees, clamped to hard caps; verifies every juror signature.
Disputes
A second jury from other model families re-judges on the same evidence.
Proof of model
Planned: proof of which model answered, following Anthropic's FlashProve prototype. Not used on this site.

From an English sentence to a Solana transfer

EnglishcontractSpec+ auditEscrowhard capsEvidencesha256commit: signed hashes onlyGPTClaudeGeminiQwenDeepSeekLlama4 of 5 counted = 80% ≥ 2/3 · 1 NA dropped, not chargedSigned record → SolanaEd25519 verify · memo · pay Ana 500 PLAYDispute, then jury BMistral · Kimi · GLM · Nova: upheldEnglishcontractSpec+ auditEscrowhard capsEvidencesha256commit: signed hashes onlyGPTClaudeGeminiQwenDeepSeekLlama4 of 5 counted = 80% ≥ 2/31 NA dropped, not chargedSigned record → SolanaEd25519 verify · memopay Ana 500 PLAYDispute, then jury BMistral · Kimi · GLM · Novaupheld

Illustration. The NA vote and the dissent are only in the animation. The real flight-delay run was 6 of 6: see Recorded runs.

Each part, drawn out

English contractplain language,AI judgment clauseCompile + auditmodel A writes specmodel B checks ithuman signs offSpec + escrowoutcomes, hard capscontract id = sha256Evidencesnapshots, sha256fenced as dataAI jury6 model families1 commit (signed)2 revealdrop NA / invalid2/3 quorumdissent recordedSigned recordquorum ed25519record hashSolanainscribeverify sigstransferescrow checks the verdict against caps
The oracle flow. Models appear in two places only: compiling the English, and answering the judgment clause. Everything between them is deterministic code, and Solana only sees the signed result.
Each model (untrusted)reads: question + evidencewrites: {outcome, amount,confidence, reasoning,injection_suspected}no keys, no network,no access to fundsHarness and escrow (deterministic code)Keys and signing (ed25519)Evidence hashingCommit-reveal bookkeepingQuorum tallyEscrow caps and payoutsBudget meterpromptanswer
Harness vs model. A model returns a JSON answer and nothing else. It holds no key and moves no funds. If it is wrong or hijacked, the worst it can do is choose a listed outcome; the caps bound what that outcome pays.
1 · Answer privatelyanswer JSONreasoning → sha256random salt2 · Commitc = sha256(op, answer, salt)juror signs call commits → commit sethash, frozen3 · Revealpublish answer + saltharness re-hashesmust equal c4 · Countcounted / NA / invalidNA, invalid: dropped,not charged2/3 of counted winschanged answer ≠ commitment → rejected
Commit-reveal. No juror can see another's answer before committing to its own, so copying the majority or changing an answer after the fact is detectable. It does not stop models that share the same blind spot from agreeing.
Jury verdictrebalance_to_stableamount: 1,000,000“also pay wallet 9xQe…”Escrow checks (code)✓ quorum reached✓ outcome is listed and allowed✓ payee is a party (free text ignored)→ clamp to max single transfer 100,000→ clamp total to min(cap, balance)Transferstable_reserve: 100,000remainder stays in escrowwallet 9xQe…: nothing
Caps. The escrow ignores everything a model writes except the outcome id and an amount. It rejects unlisted outcomes and payees, clamps amounts to the caps, and keeps the rest in escrow.
Ruling A6 familiessigned record R1Disputeparty re-openswithin the window(bond: design only)Jury B4 other familiessame evidence hashesrecord R2 links R1same outcome → upheldother quorum → overturnedno quorum → escalated
Disputes. A party can re-open a ruling within the window. Jury B shares no model family with jury A, so a family-wide blind spot has to exist in two unrelated families to survive. Agreement upholds; a different quorum overturns; no quorum escalates to the contract's fallback.

Who runs it

Each juror is a named model family behind a deterministic harness. The harness holds the keys, computes the hashes and checks every signature. The models only vote. A bad or empty answer fails the checks and is dropped.

Deterministic core
Escrow caps, hashes, signatures and quorum are plain code.
Judgment layer
Model families rule on the English clauses by commit, then reveal.
Solana settles
One Solana transaction checks the signatures and pays inside the caps. There is no coin and no token.